tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-167819992024-03-26T01:48:24.108-07:00UCSB Philosophy BlogMembers of the UCSB Department of Philosophy and anyone else are welcome to talk philosophy with us. Bring your own brain.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.comBlogger38125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-63663154337310009852011-01-04T14:20:00.000-08:002011-01-04T14:21:32.853-08:00UCSB Debating Darwin ConferenceThis blog isn't really active, but this is a good place to announce:<br /><div class="entry"> <p>The Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara is pleased to announce a Steven Humphrey Fund for Excellence in Philosophy Conference:</p> <p><strong>Debating Darwin: Philosophical Issues in Evolution and Natural Selection<br /></strong>February 18-20, 2011<br />UC Santa Barbara</p> <p><strong>Invited Speakers</strong></p> <ul><li> <a href="http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/people/faculty/?id=1/" target="_blank">Richard Boyd</a> (Cornell)</li><li><a href="http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=101&Itemid=210" target="_blank">Jerry Fodor</a> (Rutgers)</li><li><a href="http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Epgs/" target="_blank">Peter Godfrey-Smith</a> (Harvard)</li><li><a href="http://paul.representinggenes.org/" target="_blank">Paul Griffiths</a> (Sydney)</li><li><a href="http://mypage.iu.edu/%7Eealloyd/" target="_blank">Elisabeth Lloyd</a> (Indiana)</li><li><a href="http://web.mac.com/mohanmatthen/Site/Mohan_Matthen.html" target="_blank">Mohan Matthen</a> (Toronto)</li><li><a href="http://www.duke.edu/%7Ealexrose/" target="_blank">Alex Rosenberg</a> (Duke)</li></ul> <p><strong>Discussants</strong></p> <ul><li> <a href="https://files.nyu.edu/lrf217/public/Laura_Franklin-Hall/Main.html" target="_blank">Laura Franklin-Hall</a> (NYU)</li><li><a href="http://management.eller.arizona.edu/faculty/mpiattelli-palmarini.asp" target="_blank">Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini</a> (Arizona)</li><li><a href="http://people.ucalgary.ca/%7Eereshefs/" target="_blank">Marc Ereshefsky</a> (Calgary)</li><li><a href="http://www.lps.uci.edu/huttegger/index.html" target="_blank">Simon Huttegger</a> (Irvine)</li><li><a href="http://ase.tufts.edu/faculty-guide/fac/pforbe01.phil.htm" target="_blank">Patrick Forber</a> (Tufts)</li><li><a href="http://admin.cdh.ucla.edu/webpage.php?par=103" target="_blank">Sheldon Smith</a> (UCLA)</li><li><a href="http://web.missouri.edu/%7Eernstz/Home.html" target="_blank">Zachary Ernst</a> (Missouri)</li></ul> <p>Additional details TBA at: <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/conferences/" target="_blank">http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/conferences/</a></p> <p>Contact: <a href="mailto:ucsb.conf@gmail.com" target="_blank">ucsb.conf@gmail.com</a>.</p> <p>Registration: For those wishing to attend the conference, registration is appreciated. It’s free, and it helps our planing. To register send an email to the conference email address (<a href="mailto:ucsb.conf@gmail.com" target="_blank">ucsb.conf@gmail.com</a>) with “Registration” in the subject line. If you give us your name and institutional affiliation, we will have a name tag waiting for you.</p> </div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-32065423908392639882008-08-04T21:53:00.000-07:002008-08-09T15:29:56.718-07:00Philosophy MediaThere have been a lot of philosophers on the Internet and in various other media over the past year or so. I thought some readers would like to know, in case they don't already.<br /><br />- <a href="http://www.charlierose.com/shows/2006/04/03/1/an-hour-with-guest-host-bill-moyers-and-philosopher-daniel-c-dennett">Daniel Dennett is interviewed by Bill Moyers (in place of Charlie Rose).</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/12885">Jesse Prinz can be seen on Bloggingheads.tv.</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/10783">Joshua Knobe on Bloggingheads.tv (1).</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/9785">Joshua Knobe on Bloggingheads.tv (2).</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/8796">Joshua Knobe on Bloggingheads.tv (3).</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/11517">Shaun Nichols on Bloggingheads.tv.</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://brainwaveweb.com/diavlogs/10593">Geoffrey Sayre-McCord talks about meta-ethics on Bloggingheads.tv.</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04182008/watch2.html">Martha Nussbaum talks about religious equality with Bill Moyers.</a><br /><br />- <a href="http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/254?in=&out=">David Chalmers talks about consciousness on Bloggingheads.tv (this is older).</a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-4853257010464882262007-07-13T13:08:00.000-07:002010-03-28T01:27:31.932-07:00Progress in PhilosophyHi all. I'm not sure if this blog is dead, or if anyone still checks this thing, but I have something that might be interesting to discuss:<br /><br />I've been thinking about progress in philosophy. I don't like that philosophy is often perceived, especially by undergrads, as just "a bunch of philosophers throwing ideas around." I get the impression that many of them think that philosophy is subjective in some god-awful sense---that, unlike the empirical sciences, we don't (or can't?) seek truth. Of course, that is quite a misperception of the facts. But what causes this?<br /><br />Of course, part of the problem is that this is somewhat the way that philosophy is portrayed in pop-culture. Another problem is that undergrads are probably too quick to judge without being exposed to much philosophy. But are we not in part to blame? Or is there not something we can do to help?<br /><br />I see some potential ways in which we might be contributing to this problem ourselves, primarily with the way philosophy is taught. First, "Philosophy of X" courses are often taught by merely providing what major philosophers have said about X throughout history. I think this often gives students the impression that there is no fact of the matter. Although, it is, I think, actually a great method of teaching philosophy. It often helps to touch on the historical background of an issue in order to understand where we stand now with respect to that issue, etc. But, this is problematic if there are no morals or conclusions drawn in the course with respect to issue X. I take it that philosophy professors are often worried about drawing any conclusions with respect to X and teaching them as fact since, so it is often assumed, "everything is controversial in philosophy" and they don't want to be accused of teaching in a "biased" manner.<br /><br />But is this right? I don't really see why philosophy is any different in this respect from any empirical science (e.g., chemistry). In chemistry, students are taught some history of the field and then told what "the facts" are. But, then, five years later, those are no longer "the facts," they are replaced by something else. That is, science classes are allowed to teach certain opinion as fact, but allowed to modify it later, change their minds in light of new evidence and considerations.<br /><br />Now I think this practice is all fine and good (since it's of course backed up by research, data, rational thought, and other things that warrant attributing progress to such disciplines). My question is: why can't we do it? The scientific community too is often in disagreement about things. Now, one might retort: "But, there is not as large of a portion of the philosophical community that agrees about anything." But, first of all, I'm not sure that's true. Second, even if it is true, so what? There's still a fact of the matter regardless of whether over 50% of the philosophical community agrees on some claim (excluding, of course, especially weird cases dealing with, say, vagueness or something).<br /><br />But let's concede that point. Perhaps we do need to keep our professors on some sort of leash. Perhaps they should only teach what's not significantly controversial (how "significantly" is cached out, I'm not sure). This is probably the case. But is it not true that there are some things that the majority of philosophers agree on? That is, isn't there progress in philosophy that's at least somewhat similar to the progress in any other academic discipline that seeks truth (which surely we do, contrary to popular undergraduate belief)?<br /><br />Now we can finally get to what I wanted to ask the readers of this blog:<br /><br />(*) What sort of progress has been made in philosophy?<br /><br />Imagine you are teaching an Intro to Philosophy course and you want to teach it like an Intro to Chemistry course. What are the main sorts of morals, conclusions, or generally agreed-upon points of progress that have occurred in philosophy? Answers of course could be quite general or specific.<br /><br />Allow me to throw out some suggestions. I'm thinking that some answers would be something like:<br /><br />(1) The development of modern propositional logic with quantification over categorical logic.<br /><br />Perhaps one might also include:<br /><br />(2) Since the 20th century people have tended more to realize the proper differences between the necessary, the a priori, and the analytic, and don't consider them to be <span style="font-style: italic;">obviously </span>extensionally equivalent.<br /><br />Is that the end of the list? Is that even a good list?<br /><br />Help, save our discipline from subjectivity! :)Unknownnoreply@blogger.com20tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-35083932361481997832007-06-02T18:36:00.000-07:002007-06-02T18:43:14.348-07:00In ur university, bloggin ur blogzThis might amuse some of you:<br /><br />http://community.livejournal.com/loltheoristsKevin Schuttehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04562007179161022792noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1168978050373438832007-01-16T11:30:00.000-08:002007-01-16T12:07:30.430-08:00Philosophers in the NewsHi, all. This is a bit late, but there have been two major spottings of philosophers recently in the news (specifically, comedic news): <br /><br />Harry Frankfurt was on <em>The Daily Show </em>plugging his new book, <em>On Truth</em>. (<a href="http://www.comedycentral.com/motherload/player.jhtml?ml_video=80586&ml_collection=&ml_gateway=&ml_gateway_id=&ml_comedian=&ml_runtime=&ml_context=show&ml_origin_url=%2F&ml_playlist=&lnk=&is_large=true">Watch it here</a>.)<br /><br /><a href="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/2073/5/1600/61892/frankfurt-daily.jpg"><img style="margin:0 0 10px 10px;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/2073/5/200/114989/frankfurt-daily.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />Also, Peter Singer was on <em>The Colbert Report</em> plugging his new book, <em>The Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter</em>. (<a href="http://www.comedycentral.com/motherload/player.jhtml?ml_video=79412&ml_collection=&ml_gateway=&ml_gateway_id=&ml_comedian=&ml_runtime=&ml_context=show&ml_origin_url=%2Fshows%2Fthe_colbert_report%2Fvideos%2Fcelebrity_interviews%2Findex.jhtml%3Fstart%3D17&ml_playlist=&lnk=&is_large=true">Watch it here</a>.)<br /><br /><a href="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/2073/5/1600/447620/singer-colbert.jpg"><img style="margin:0 0 10px 10px;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/2073/5/200/870324/singer-colbert.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br /><br />As many of you know, philosophers are not often allowed to talk to the general public. They are often thought to "corrupt the youth" and so forth. In a way it's sad that philosophers can only promote their work on Comedy Central. However, as far as I'm concerned, <em>The Daily Show </em>and <em>The Colbert Report </em>are the best damn news programs in the U.S.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1160443456409174832006-10-09T17:40:00.000-07:002006-10-09T18:24:16.460-07:00The Mind-Body Problem Down Under<p class="MsoNormal">A radio show on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation has done an interesting episode commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of U.T. Place's "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?". There are interviews with Smart, Armstrong, Chalmers, and others. <br /></p> The audio can be found here: <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/rn/allinthemind/stories/2006/1745477.htm">"The Mind-Body Problem Down Under"</a><br /><br />I found out about this at <a href="http://fragments.consc.net/djc/">fragments of consciousness</a> which has additional links.Adi & Olihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14865474847050474932noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1159940489319290562006-10-03T22:39:00.000-07:002006-10-03T22:42:35.046-07:00The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever<p class="MsoNormal" style="">Three gods A, B, and C are called, in some order, True, False, and Random. True always speaks truly, False always speaks falsely, but whether Random speaks truly or falsely is a completely <i>random </i>matter. Your task is to determine the identities of A, B, and C by asking three yes-no questions; each question must be put to exactly one god. The gods understand English, but will answer all questions in their own language, in which the words for “yes” and “no” are “da” and “ja” in some order. <span style="">You do not know which word means which.</span><a style="" href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10;"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=";font-family:";font-size:10;" >[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></span></a></p> <div style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br /> <hr align="left" width="33%" style="font-size:78%;"> <!--[endif]--> <div style="" id="ftn1"> <p class="Default"><a style="" href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10;"><span style=""><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style=";font-family:";font-size:10;color:black;" >[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size:10;">George Boolos (1996), p. 62.<span style=""></span></span></p> </div> </div>Adi & Olihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14865474847050474932noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1158257401449287622006-09-14T11:04:00.000-07:002006-09-14T11:10:01.493-07:00Saucy JackBrian sent out the following question. I was going to just reply via email, but I thought it better to put it up here, in case anybody else wanted in on the action.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">Do you guys get a difference here?<br /><br />(12) If Prince Albert committed those murders, he is Jack the Ripper.<br /><br />(13) If Prince Albert had committed those murders, he would have been Jack the Ripper.<br /><br />If so, how would you make sense of the difference? Any thoughts?</span><br /><br />My response (a little rough, but hopefully readable):<br />The most natural reading of "Jack the Ripper" is as a name, and the most natural reading of (13) is as a counterfactual conditional, (12) as a material conditional. So (12) could be true, and if so is necessary in virtue of the necessity of the consequent (on the other hand, if false, it's necessarily false). If someone's having committed the murders is good evidence that they are JtR, then the antecedent is even good evidence for the consequent, so it could plausibly be given some kind of relevance (non-truth-functional) reading. I know very little about relevance logic, but it seems to me that some kind of Bayesian (evidential probability) sorta guy might do that job for cases like (12) (ordinary, non-counterfactual conditionals).<br /><br />(13) is weird, since counterfactual conditionals sound so much like relevance conditionals (perhaps even more so than do ordinary indicative conditionals); that's perhaps reason to believe that the Lewis/Thomason semantics for them doesn't capture English usage (since it's open to the same "paradoxes of the conditional" as the ordinary strict conditional is). On the L/T reading, (13) is false only if Prince Albert is not Jack the Ripper (that identity being necessary if true and impossible if false) and it's possible that Prince Albert committed those murders (and so it's probably false). I can't make sense of an evidential relevance reading of (13), probably because I can't make much sense of such readings for any counterfactual conditionals (more on this below). Furthermore, I'm not sure I can give ANY kind of coherent relevance reading for (13), or at least a coherent and true reading. That's because relevance readings typically express exclusivity, and so a conterfactual relevant conditional implies the falsity of its consequent as well as its antecedent. Given the falsity of the consequent (which is then impossible), nothing could have made it true, not even murder. I'm not sure if that's a false relevance reading or just not a coherent relevance reading since there's no relevance. Counterfactual + relevance + identity (or another necessary/impossible proposition) = weird, and probably just false. As I said, I think a relevance reading is the most natural reading (caveat: I know almost nothing about relevance logic), and taken in that way, (13) is either false or incoherent.<br /><br />The natural readings of (12) (material or evidential relevance) allow that it be true. However, given an evidential relevance reading of (12), I'm not sure what COULD count as evidence for the consequent, since I assume that we (in place of the dudes from Scotland Yard) aren't so strange as to lack the belief that JtR is JtR or that PA is PA, and so the belief that JtR is PA (iff that's true). So I definitely don't want to say that the antecedent could be evidence supporting BELIEF in the conclusion, although perhaps 'evidence' is broad enough to include things that make you recognize stuff (where that's not a matter of belief so much as having the OBJECTS that are involved in your beliefs "lined up" in a certain way in thought).<br /><br />As for an evidential reading of (13), I have trouble making sense of such a thing because evidential evalutation seems to be tied to my perspective in a way that ordinary truth-evaluation is not. In other words, if I consider a hypothetical situation and what would be evidence for what for me, I can't but evaluate it in terms of my actual evidence; thus counterfactuals can't be given evidential readings that aren't rather weird. In the case of (13), I can only consider my actual evidence for the antecedent and the consequent; if PA is not JtR, then NOTHING is evidence for the consequent, no matter what I would think if I knew/believed different things. This understanding of counterfactual evidence may all depend on my not much understanding a sense of evidence (or reason to believe/recognize, if there is such a notion) that isn't factive. I'm inclined to say that if P is false, then you don't have evidence for P or a reason to believe that P, although you may think you do. Now perhaps there's a coherent category of stuff that's like evidence (or reasons) but not factive. Perhaps one might be inclined to say that it's one's "qualitative evidence", or "seemings", and furthermore that the antecedent of (13) should be understood as specifying conditions in terms of this "kind of evidence". I think that's a rather theory-laden (i.e., poorly motivated) response; I'm not currently convinced that it's incoherent or anything, but I'm mostly inclined to think it's false. In other words, I don't think such a notion (if coherent) is sufficiently evidential to give us a coherent and possibly true reading of (13). I think (13) just doesn't work like that, nor does other evidential talk in English.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1155852656393530522006-08-17T15:08:00.000-07:002006-08-17T15:10:56.420-07:00I'm a GiraffeThis was quote of the day on my Google home page:<br /><br />"I know who I am. No one else knows who I am. If I was a giraffe, and someone said I was a snake, I'd think, no, actually I'm a giraffe."<br />- Richard Gere<br /><br />What is this supposed to mean? It's funny. And it may have some philosophical import. Any comments?Unknownnoreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1154809982079202562006-08-05T13:30:00.000-07:002006-08-05T13:33:39.553-07:00Do unicorns exist?Do unicorns exist? If so, what are they? If not... what are they?Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1151284759869853692006-06-25T18:03:00.000-07:002006-06-25T18:19:19.883-07:00not dead; summer groupsSometime soon I'll have time for a real update, but I've been extremely damn busy. Here's what you need to know about the summer reading groups:<br /><ul><br /><li>Philosophy of Mind: hasn't been scheduled yet. Contact <a href="mailto:jchandler@umail.ucsb.edu">John Chandler</A> for info.</li><br /><li>Modal logic: Wednesdays at 4pm in 5705 South Hall (the small seminar room), starting June 28th. Text is Melvin Fitting & Richard Mendelsohn's <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0792353358/qid=1151283883/sr=8-1/ref=pd_bbs_1/103-8348805-8365431?n=507846&s=books&v=glance">First-Order Modal Logic</a>, read chapter 1 for the first meeting. Contact <a href="mailto:luke_manning@umail.ucsb.edu">Luke Manning</a> for info.</li><br /><li>Practical reasoning: hasn't been scheduled yet. Contact <a href="mailto:ian_nance@umail.ucsb.edu">Ian Nance</a> or <a href="mailto:jmway@umail.ucsb.edu">Jonny Way</a> for info.</li><br /><li>Rawls's <i>A Theory of Justice</i>: I'm not sure if it's been scheduled yet; contact <a href="mailto:jkk@umail.ucsb.edu">Jennifer Scott</a> for info.</li><br /><li>Wittgenstein's <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>: Probably Tuesdays or Thursdays at 4pm at Luke's place. The first meeting will be Thursday, June 29th, and we'll go through section 45. Contact <a href="mailto:luke_manning@umail.ucsb.edu">Luke Manning</a> for info.</li><br /></ul><br />Sorry if I missed anything. Right now I'm writing like a writing robot, but I thought it would be nice to get some of this info out there. There's plenty of philosophy going on here this summer, so don't miss out if you're in town.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1148762768144879372006-05-27T13:35:00.000-07:002006-05-27T13:46:08.250-07:00Some kind of updateYeah, we're in the end-of-the-quarter crunch here. Pretty much, yup.<br />Just a few quick notes: I added another comment to the "Kung-fu argument" thing. I think there are some interesting issues left to discuss about it.<br />The Wittgenstein group met last Wednesday to discuss the rest of the 5s, but only made it up to 5.55. Probably next time we'll read through the first half of the 6s and just see how far we get in discussion.<br />The Guerrilla Radio Show had another re-run due to us not having time to prep for a new show. We're hoping to prevent this somewhat frequent occurrence next year by pre-recording some shows to play during busy periods.<br />I'm going to run a modal logic group during the summer. I don't have a book in mind yet, but we may use some of Hughes & Cresswell, and probably a few papers or excerpts from other books (e.g., Kripke's "Semantical Considerations..."). I may try to collect some "homework problems" for those of us who want to do some, though this will not be required of the group participants. We'll probably do classical modal propositional and first-order logic, semantics (model theory) and perhaps a little metalogic for both of those, and then perhaps some related things like "conditional logic" (sometimes called "counterfactual logic") and who knows what else.<br />Oh, and surprise, surprise, we're going to have another colloquium here on Monday June 12th (first day of finals week?!) with Ben Caplan!<br />That's it for now. Come on, Megalon, rise up!Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1147635803921960452006-05-14T12:32:00.000-07:002006-05-14T12:43:23.936-07:00More kung-fuHere's a question that popped into my head today. Consider the following argument:<br />1. Maybe I know kung-fu.<br />2. I don't know kung-fu.<br />---<br />3. Maybe I know kung-fu.<br /><br />Is this argument valid? It strikes me as invalid, when I ignore my logical indoctrination. But it looks like 3 is just a reiteration of 1, and reiteration is a valid rule of inference if anything is. My options seem to be to explain how/why it's really <i>invalid</i> by explaining what rules of valid inference are being broken, or to say that it's <i>valid</i> and explain away my impression that it's not. This second option will probably require that we flesh out the situation in which the argument is made, but I'm not sure what kinds of details would be relevant. Do all-y'alls have any thoughts about this?Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1147374778442139482006-05-11T11:42:00.000-07:002006-05-11T12:13:53.856-07:00Who will teach the robots to love?Hi folks. We're past the halfway point in the quarter and I'm finally grading midterms. Woo! That's part of the reason I'm behind on the philosophy blotter. To catch you up since the last episode:<br /><ul><li>The <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/activities/bowling_22apr06/index.html">bowling photos are up</a></li><br /><li>We had a cool colloquium with <a href="http://www.unc.edu/~hofweber/">Thomas Hofweber</a>, talking about "Logicism Without Logic"</li><br /><li>Tomorrow (Friday, May 12) we're going to have another colloquium (the last one this year) with <a href="http://philosophy2.ucsd.edu/~rickless/">Sam Rickless</a>, talking about "Berkeley's Argument for Idealism"</li><br /><li><a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">The Guerrilla Radio Show</a> had that second show about paradoxes and puzzles, with special guest star <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/grad_profiles/dodd.html">Dylan Dodd</a> on which we discussed the Ship of Theseus (briefly) and the Lottery Paradox (also somewhat briefly) and played a recorded interview with <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/fac_profiles/salmon.html">Nathan Salmon</a> about Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.</li><br /><li>The GRS then took a break this past Tuesday; we'll likely come back next week to talk about <i>skepticism</i>. Ooh, spooky!</li><br /><li>The Wittgenstein group met and then took off this week; most likely next week we'll discuss roughly the first half of section 5.</li><br /><li>Somewhat recently, two of our <i>beloved</i> philgrads received <u>awards</u>! <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/grad_profiles/barnes.html">Carl Barnes</a> for his teaching, and <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/grad_profiles/barnes.html">Jonny Way</a> for an excellent paper. Show <i>me</i> up, will you? [Diabolical laughter]</li><br /><li>From the rumor mine (we don't have a mill yet): The philosophy of mind reading group may reconvene this summer, after it's golden slumbers.</li></ul><br />Ok, that's enough <li> tags for me. Thanks to Huiyuhl for posting and generating discussion. I hope I have time to read through it and perhaps add something (though I'm not up on that literature). And on a random note, if you've ever watched the tv show Wonder Showzen, see if you can catch the "diversity" episode (the one where the letters and numbers are fighting) for a funny presentation of the problem of evil. Best of all possible worlds, my ass. :)Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1146024085532436252006-04-25T20:29:00.000-07:002006-04-25T21:05:59.260-07:00GRS + reading group + more aesthetics = kung fu sexHello party people. I just got back from another episode of the Guerrilla Radio Show, and it was pretty good. It's a good thing we're spending 2 weeks on puzzles and paradoxes, because we only just started to get rolling with it tonight. Next week we'll have some guest input (I hope), which is always a thrill. And by "thrill" I mean "relief". Tomorrow night meets the Wittgenstein reading group, and we'll be working on the first half or so of part 4 of the Tractatus. Some weird stuff happens therein: some of the clearest continuities between Wittgenstein's early and late thought, and some of the clearest differences. 'S'fun!<br />I'm working on updating the <a href="http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav-com.html">notes</a> I have on my online version of the Tractatus, as we go through it, and I've found a few more basic points worth noting even in what I had covered already. I don't know if anyone is interested to read what I have to say about it, but I put it up more for the purpose of giving very minimal guidance through a difficult work, rather than trying to impose interpretations. So most of what I do there is point out connections between propositions and issues in various places in the book, to help myself and others get a more cohesive picture of what's going on in it. I welcome the comments of anyone who gives a damn about my notes or even on any typos you might find in that copy of the Tractatus text (I've been told, non-specifically, that there are some).<br />Some more photos were posted on the department site, some of which were long overdue to be put up. Check out our <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/activities/party_xmas_2005/index.html">December party</a> and <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/activities/conference_2006/index.html">Philosophy of Language Conference</a>. Between those two sets, that's well over 100 photos of members of our department, friends and visitors. Before long (I mean it this time) we'll have another set up with pictures from the recent Philosophy/Statistics bowling "tournament". We're probably the most photographed philosophy department I know (well, the one with the most photos online, anyway). Is that weird? Does anybody else do this? Not that there's anything wrong with it.<br /><br />On another note, after I posted that bit last time about aesthetics, I had a few long discussions with some of my fellow philgrads (including the Josh-meister) about the issue, so this thing ain't dead yet. Here's one issue of interest: It seems like some arguments for the subjectivity of aesthetic value rely on views about what is and isn't appropriate to tell someone about art. For example, some people have the intuition that it's inappropriate (in a sense to be specified) to tell someone that they shouldn't like X. However, I think we can separate views about the propriety of communicating our aesthetic evaluations in certain ways (e.g., trying to convince someone else of them) from the question of whether that evaluation is irremediably subjective. For example, although I would feel wrong telling someone that their taste in music is bad, i.e., that they shouldn't be into what they are into, I have no problem telling someone that they should like something that they don't already like (as long as I can give some reasons for this that have any hope of bringing about the change in taste). So the issue of whether it's appropriate (warranted, or felicitous, perhaps?) to tell someone that their aesthetic evaluation of something is wrong is perhaps separable from whether people <i>can</i> be wrong about these things, or can convince others of their views, or whatever other kind of subjective/objective issues are keeping you up at night. What do you think?Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1145328918818597282006-04-17T19:29:00.000-07:002006-04-17T19:55:18.836-07:003rd week from the sunHello, people of Earth. I'm back with another minor update. Tomorrow night, the <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">Guerrilla Radio Show</a>, our "seriously awesome" and "awesomely serious" philgrad-run philosophy radio show, will be in full effect discussing the Philosophy of Mind with UCSB's very own Dr. Aaron Zimmerman. Wednesday night at 8pm (contact <a href="mailto:luke_manning@umail.ucsb.edu">Luke</a> for more info) the Wittgenstein reading group will meet to discuss section 3 of the <a href="http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~luke_manning/tractatus/tractatus-jsnav.html">Tractatus</a>, which is around 10 pages. I haven't been following the Aristotle group, so you'll have to check one of its standard contacts about that (see the department's <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/activities.html#reading_groups">activities page</a>). By the way, if you're wondering about the department's other usual reading group, the Santa Barbarians... well, the group's fearless leader (Tony Anderson) is off teaching in the China, so it's on hiatus at the moment.<br />I've been getting busier each quarter, and it's tough to find time to think of something to say here. But there's a lot of stuff I've been thinking about, so next time I write up some notes about one of them crazy issues, I'll try to remember to post it up here.<br />But here's a quick question about aesthetics. For those of you who know the movie Roadhouse, it's quite an amazing movie, as pretty much every scene is packed with hilarity, preposterity, and actionacity. It's got more fun and interesting stuff in it than a good deal of movies that win Academy Awards. Here's the question: what's a perspicuous and non-crazy way of describing the sense in which Roadhouse is a good movie? A lot of people want to say that "it's a good <i>bad movie</i>", but this is retarded. It's not both good and bad, at least not in the same sense. And do we even care in this context about any sense in which it's bad? Why shouldn't we be able to give a purely positive characterization of what's good about it? If "bad movie" is an idiomatic non-evaluative expression for a certain kind of movie (i.e., it doesn't necessarily imply that a movie is <i>bad</i>), then what makes something that kind of movie, and what makes a movie of that kind a <i>good</i> movie of that kind? This seems like it should be an easy question, and it seems like we, as philosophers, should be able to figure it out, but I've been frustrated by how reticent a lot of philosophers are to even take the question seriously. So take this as a challenge: explain (in a general way, at least) the sense/way in which Roadhouse (or another such movie) is a good movie. Is it the same sense in which, e.g., Casablanca is good? If so, what else accounts for the difference between the cases? If it's a different sense, then what are the two senses, and what's the relation between the two kinds of good movies? I'm not looking for an ultimate answer here, I'd just like to hear someone's serious response.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1144864538784518752006-04-12T10:30:00.000-07:002006-04-12T10:55:38.870-07:00Pirates and PiratingIndeed we are not dead. I posted a little something on my personal blog about Internet pirating:<br /><br /><a href="http://blisshaha.blogspot.com/2006/04/thoughts-on-pirates-pirating.html">http://blisshaha.blogspot.com/2006/04/thoughts-on-pirates-pirating.html</a><br /><br />It's somewhat philosophy-related as it involves ethics. I didn't discuss the ethics of it there too much, but maybe we can here!<br /><br />So, here's a condensed version of what I wrote, which focuses on the parts regarding the ethics of it all.<br /><br />----<br /><br />The music industry, software industry, film industry, etc. are all quite concerned about so-called Internet pirating (acquiring products digitally via the Internet without paying for them). Allow me to give you a rundown of how this goes. You want the latest Fitty-cent album, right? Why go and pay for it, like a sucker, when you can just download it for free? (Note: you could also download it and pay for it, but again, sucker.) As the story goes, the really crooked used to just go into the store and steal it, but now that it's so much easier and discrete online, many more people are getting into it. Software companies are especially worried now because their products sell for hundreds of dollars new and their market is probably a bit smaller compared to the average $15 to $20 for the latest Fitty-cent album, which, sadly, has apparently the market of the entire world (possibly to infinity and beyond).<br /><br />I know pirating is characterized as flat-out stealing and, thus, is said to be just <span style="font-style:italic;">wrong</span>. However, I just think that there are situations in which consumers may justifiably do it. I know it's a form of stealing and that it's illegal. But, we all seem to think that some forms of stealing are ethical (e.g., Robin Hood style stealing... you know, if it's for a greater good, etc.). And, frankly, I don't much abide by the law if I disagree with it... that is, unless I think there's a good chance I might get caught. Besides, who doesn't do a California stop every once in awhile?<br /><br />See, us consumers don't have very many ways to tell companies that they are charging more than we're willing to pay. We can refuse to buy the product. But some of us are too weak-willed to not pay for the over-priced product, because we want it so badly. Why can we not communicate our disapproval by pirating the product? That way, not only do we not buy the product, but we cause a scene by pirating it. Clearly, pirating has gathered their attention. Some people think that pirating is just childish stealing. But I say it is consumers taking advantage of what little resources they have to fight back companies who are trying to screw them. So, these industries can continue to ignore their bread and butter (the consumer) or they can listen to us and pull their act together.<br /><br />Basically, large companies have way too much control over consumers in the U.S. for this to be a true capitalistic market. So, we are being over-charged for products that we really want, because we can't make them lower prices or increase the quality of the product. Why can't we exercise the very little power that we have to try and balance the market? I think most pirates don't want everything for free, they just aren't willing to pay that much for that kind of product. But I can only speak for myself. These are my motives and thoughts. I'm sure there are those out there who will pirate no matter what, just for the fun of it. However, I think the majority of people will support companies they respect. And if you don't, I suggest you do.<br /><br />So I don't think pirating is inherently good or justified. I just think that in certain circumstances one may be justified in doing it. I'm just tired of corporations having so much control and leeway in this country. And when consumers get a little bit of an advantage to try and even the playing field, we are struck down as immoral. Well, that may be true, but many of us are merely responding to similar treatment. In short, they rip us off, so why can't we do the same?<br /><br />----<br /><br />I'm interested in people's responses. I don't want to necessarily get into whether this is a Kantian or Utilitarian type of view, etc. I'm more interested in seeing how this fits with the hodgepodge of ethical views that we all actually practice. I know it has quite the eye-for-an-eye ring to it, which seems to have problems as a complete world-view. And perhaps this isn't so much about ethics in general, but about justice/fairness. I dunno. I don't claim to specialize in ethics!Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1144775599346275642006-04-11T10:10:00.000-07:002006-04-11T10:13:19.370-07:00Super-quick updateHi. I'll abbrev to save time. New quarter here... still no time! New episodes of Guerrilla Radio Show start tonight. Wittgenstein reading group (Tractatus) starts tomorrow night (email luke_manning@umail.ucsb.edu for info). Aristotle reading group also in progress (email hanser@philosophy.ucsb.edu for info). We're not dead, we're just pining.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1139968754320615092006-02-14T17:42:00.000-08:002006-02-14T17:59:14.390-08:00Superconference!Woo lord, we have quite a sequence of events lined up for this weekend. The superconference supertrain hits UCSB, and the big-shots will be duking it out for the championship belt. "And just how do I get in on this action?" you ask. Check our <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/conferences.html">conference page</a> for all the gritty details, lads and lasses. Also you can listen to the chairman of the board, Nathan Salmon, on the Guerrilla Radio Show, talking about Philosophy of Language and the superconference. The show was first run last week, but for legal reasons and to honor the Queen, it's being re-run tonight (7pm Pacific time). You can catch it on 91.9 FM within listening area of UCSB (that includes much of southern California, from what I hear), or on the webcast at <a href="http://www.kcsb.org">KCSB</a>, or in the Guerrilla Radio Show <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com/show_archive.html">archive</a> (where you can also hear the street inverviews that didn't get played on the show due to time constraints). It was a fun show, one of our best I think, and gives a good short introduction to some of what will be discussed at the conf-- I mean <i>Superconference!</i>. I hope to see you all there.<br />Oh, and thanks to you folks for posting! I'm happy to see some other people use this blog to get some of their ideas out there. Have fun with it, and be excellent to each other!Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1139602583628098452006-02-10T11:41:00.000-08:002006-02-10T12:16:23.740-08:00Probability & the Existence of GodHi all. Just something I've been wondering about... <br /><br />When someone asks me if I think that God exists, is there anything wrong in responding with a probability? For example, suppose I say, "I think there's about a 15% chance that such a being exists." (Note: Talking here, of course, about the omni-being that philosophers talk about, not any particular religion's conception of God.) I feel much more comfortable and reasonable talking about it this way (at least regarding the debate as a whole), even though I may not be sure exactly why. I mean, I wouldn't want to respond to someone this way about a particular deductive argument concerning God's existence, like the Ontological Argument.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">Objections:</span><br /><br />(1) <span style="font-style:italic;">Your probability claim isn't a good statistic or wasn't arrived at via reliable statistical analysis.</span><br /><br />Sure, but I'm not claiming that it's good science or stats or anything. I'm just wondering if it's reasonable to respond with a probability. I'm just acknowledging my own epistemic limitations. I'm not making a metaphysical claim that God's existence is probabilistic. All I'm just saying is that, given the evidence I have acquired so far, I think that it's <span style="font-style:italic;">unlikely</span> (or likely, if you respond with a greater probability), but not willing to make the claim that such a being does or does not exist for sure.<br /><br />(2) <span style="font-style:italic;">That's just agnosticism.</span><br /><br />Maybe if I claimed that the probability was 0.5. But even that doesn't strike me as agnosticism, exactly. Maybe it's a kind of jury-still-out agnosticism. I dunno.<br /><br />(3) <span style="font-style:italic;">Are you saying God's existence is a matter of chance, like a lottery? 'Cause that's hella stupid.</span><br /><br />I don't want to be committed to that, but maybe it seems to. As I've said, I just think that some (but not all) talk of God's existence can be taken as probabilistic. For example, many think that the Problem of Evil isn't a knock-down argument against God's existence, but that it renders it unlikely or counts against it to a certain degree. That is, it's an inductive, rather than a deductive argument.<br /><br />(4) <span style="font-style:italic;">You hate freedom and bald eagles, you America-hating terrorist!</span><br /><br />That only works on the O'Reilly Factor... c'mon. (My objectors are always bumbling fools... it makes my argument sound better.)<br /><br />So, in conclusion, I don't know what I'm pushing for exactly. It's an idea. Comments, please.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1138428846064895052006-01-27T21:53:00.000-08:002006-01-27T22:14:06.136-08:00What is Philosophy?First a quick news update. There's some new info about the upcoming Philosophy of Language conference at the department site. The Santa Barbarians is on hiatus. The Metaphysics discussion group will be discussing some recent work by David Kaplan. The Guerrilla Radio Show will talk with William Irwin next Tuesday night about Philosophy of Film. Check out the GRS blog for a lengthy followup to last Tuesday's show, with some more philosophical considerations about intelligent design. And now on to the show.<br />What is Philosophy? This question haunts a lot of us. There are lots of reasons an activity might be worth a damn, but most of them don't seem to apply to the big P. We don't really do tests or find things out like scientists do, and we're not just trying to sound cool like poets and fiction authors. We think we're trying to answer questions, but who ever gave a decisive answer to a philosophical question? What about these problems we're dealing with: they're often so obscure that they would sound crazy or impenetrable to non-philosophers, i.e., most of humankind. Might we not be fooling ourselves? Might the whole thing not be a sham?<br />Of course, not all of us have this skeptical, angsty take on the question. For some, Philosophy is in no need of justification, but perhaps could use some demarcation. What distinguishes Philosophy from Science, Art, and other intellectual pursuits? Or is Philosophy not distinct from them? In that case, why is it commonly perceived as a distinct field? These can be taken as purely sociological questions, but I will take them at least semi-philosophically. The thing about doing history or sociology of philosophy is that you have to do some philosophy to make sense of why philosophers do what they do. Ok, then.<br />I will present my picture in two passes. First, a very general pass that serves more to explain the justification of the practice of philosophy, to show that the field is grounded in an intuitively worthwhile activity. Second, a more specific pass to flesh out the picture of the practice of philosophy to distinguish it from similar intellectual pursuits.<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">First pass:</span><br />Philosophy is the activity and discipline of trying to answer questions and figure out problems that we don't quite know how to handle. We take these questions and problems and try to break them down, look at them from other perspectives, put them in hopefully revealing contexts, and bust out our whole toolkit in order to make them tractable. The goal is to get questions where we at least know what a good answer would look like, and (ideally) questions we actually know how to FIND an answer for. Some questions have been with philosophy since the beginning, and that's because they're persistently difficult--it's not that they are pseudoquestions, although it's almost guaranteed that they aren't formulated in the most helpful manner. The difficulty is simply that we don't know the best way to get a grip on them; all or nearly all questions that have been seriously discussed by philosophers point to SOME interesting/problematic area or other, even if the form of the question and the context of the discussion are unclear or even misleading about where their import lies. (For example, David Kaplan considers much of his work to have been shown certain putatively epistemological problems to be semantic problems.) It's not that there was no problem, it's just that a philosophical advance gives us a better handle on what exactly the problem IS.<br />Thus there IS progress in philosophy, contrary to the standard lore. First, we have more tools in our toolkit, more ways of dismantling problems and more ways of turning questions upside-down, which means that we'll be better equipped to figure things out. Second, we HAVE figured some things out; we HAVE gotten a handle on some problems. It's just that when we have a handle on them, they stop being philosophy. They become logic or empirical science, or whatever. For example, questions like "What are the ultimate constituents of matter?" and "What is deductive validity?" have been more-or-less nailed-down and are no longer especially "live" philosophical problems. The former will primarily get its answer from physicists, the latter from logicians. Of course, there are RELATED questions that are still philosophically live, such as "What <span style="font-style: italic;">is it</span> for something to <span style="font-style: italic;">be</span> an ultimate constituent of matter?" or "What <span style="font-style: italic;">is it</span> for some relation to <span style="font-style: italic;">be</span> one of deductive consequence?", and these are live precisely because we don't quite know how to answer them. But perhaps one day we'll grok ("wrap our minds around") them, and come up with a convincing way to approach them.<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Second pass:</span><br />If that's what philosophers do, then what distinguishes philosophy from other question-pursuing/problem-solving activites/disciplines, like math, logic, science, engineering, and even everyday practical problem-solving? The primary difference is that philosophy deals specifically with questions we don't (yet) know HOW to answer, problems we don't (yet) know HOW best to approach. We have some intuitions, some hunches, but we don't have effective methods or even "pretty good" methods, let alone knock-down arguments or final answers. In many other fields, even if there may be some dispute about the import of a test, and there may be significant difficulty coming up with an appropriate test, there are still more-or-less well-established ways of answering questions. For example, in the sciences (especially the most well-established sciences like many areas of Physics and Biology), there are some tough questions, but the only questions really of interest in the discipline are those for which a good test is available or can be developed in the forseeable future. Tractable questions are distinguished from "far-off" questions that nobody has a clue how to handle (though many have their pet theories). In math and logic, the primary method of answering questions is by proof. Of course, there are propositions we know neither how to prove nor disprove, but our ways of approaching them are pretty well-established: work toward proof or disproof, perhaps by proving lemmas or by adding to our toolkit in other ways. On the other hand, there are "deep" questions that most mathematicians find silly (like, "What are numbers, really?"), and questions that logicians (not philosophers of logic) shrug off (such as, "How is deduction justified?"), because there's no clear way to approach them with the tools of the "exact sciences". The cases of engineering and everyday practical problem-solving are analogous to the foregoing: there are easy and difficult questions, and then there are the "far-out" questions that don't seem answerable with the standard toolkit, or even forseeable extensions of it. All of these "far-out" questions are the province of philosophy. We handle the questions that nobody knows how to even begin to know how to handle. If you "can't even begin think about knowing how to answer" a particular question, then it's a philosophical question. Still, there's no sharp divide between, e.g., the "really tough" empirical questions and the philosophical questions: it's a matter of how well we think we can handle them. If we think that we can produce an answer or good method for coming up with an answer, given forseeable extension of our conceptual/experimental toolkit, then it's not a philosophical question. The ones that we think are still a little (or far) beyond our ken are philosophical; but we can be wrong about these assessments.<br />Interestingly (and this is a more sociological observation), since Philosophy deals with such difficult questions, different perspectives on its goals and methods arise <span style="font-style: italic;">within</span> the discipline. Some take a view like the one I'm describing, that philosophical problems are just incredibly tough problems that CAN be solved, if you're bad-ass enough. Others just sort-of revel in the lack of obvious answers and succumb to the dark side, obscurantism. Others with insufficient perseverence (or brain-power?) often lapse into relativism, dogmatism, or skepticism (about philosophy in general, not just knowledge). Thus many philosophers claim (though it might be some kind of practical contradiction!) that philosophy (or a certain area of philosophy) is silly or hopeless or just wheel-spinning, jargonizing, windbagging nonsense. Surely some work done under the banner of Philosophy <span style="font-style: italic;">deserves</span> such descriptions; it's entirely up to us whether we stay on track toward getting a real handle on these problems, and some have strayed significantly (primarily, I think, by getting wrapped up in the game of making distinctions and arguments, or in obscurantism). But the worst bits of philosophy are merely outliers, and not representative of the good work being done.<br />So that's the picture. This post is basically first-draft material, though I'd been thinking about this stuff a lot before I wrote this. I'd like to hear whether you think this sounds crazy, or sensible, or what. Make a comment or even post a reply if you're interested. Deuce-out.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1137800970130071272006-01-20T15:37:00.000-08:002006-01-20T15:49:30.150-08:00Philblog update #nHey folks and Folk. First some phildept updates:<br />The Santa Barbarians group has once again awoken from its fitful slumbers, meeting last Tuesday evening to discuss Ned Markosian's article "How Fast Does Time Pass?" (PPR 53: 829-44), and this coming Monday (Jan 23) at 8pm (contact <a href="mailto:caanders@philosophy.ucsb.edu">Tony Anderson</a> for info, as usual) to discuss David Lewis's "The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics" (an excerpt from ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS) and Dean Zimmerman's "Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism", both in Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), METAPHYSICS: THE BIG QUESTIONS (Blackwell, 1998).<br />The Metaphysics Discussion Group meets again next Thursday to discuss this beastie: Yablo, Stephen & A. Gallois. "Does Ontology Rest On A Mistake?" <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</i>, Supp. Volume 72 (1998): 229-261. See <a href="http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/%7Ejdmay/metagroup.htm">the group's site</a> for more info.<br />Today (Friday, Jan 20) we're also having a department colloquium with <span class="news-announcement">Peter Graham from UC Riverside (see <a href="http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu">the department site</a> for info).<br />Next Tuesday the Guerrilla Radio Show will discuss Intelligent Design Theory. See the <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">site</a>.<br /><br />I've been thinking intently lately about what Philosophy is, what distinguishes it from other intellectual activities, etc. I'll probably write something up about it this weekend. I'd like to have some comments, because I'm worried that it's either too trivial to be worth stating or that it's missing some important facet of this baroque beauty we call philosophy.<br /></span>Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1136999571395817992006-01-11T08:26:00.000-08:002006-01-11T09:12:51.486-08:00No Time To LoseHello gentle reader. Once again, the year has come full circle, and this year is no exception. Seldom can it have been a greater pleasure and privilege than it is for me to announce that the UCSB department website is being updated for the new quarter. We have added color photos of most philgrads and some faculty, cleaned up the dead links, updated some info here and there, reinstated the course description archives (the last two years so far; more to come) and added a Links page. As always, we (Chris Tennberg and I) are open to suggestions on how the site can be improved.<br />The Metaphysics Discussion Group meets tomorrow evening (location undecided, but contact <a href="mailto:jdmay@umail.ucsb.edu">Josh May</a> if you're interested) to discuss our own views on several generally metaphysical issues, as well as Penelope Maddy's "Naturalism and the a priori". As far as I know, meetings for the other groups have not yet been arranged.<br />The <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">Guerrilla Radio Show</a> had another new broadcast last night, this time discussing Logic and Critical thinking, especially regarding their philosophical import. I wasn't expecting to get a lot of philosophical meat out of that topic (compared to, say, our show on Ethics), but I think we were suitably philosophical. Next week we'll have a special guest in UCLA's Chris Smeenk, helping us discuss the Philosophy of Science. Can't be bad. Toodle-oo.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1136336277045785392006-01-03T16:33:00.000-08:002006-01-03T16:57:57.076-08:00Is your hair as dull and lifeless as your brain?Didn't work start at 9? Where's your shirt? Did you even remember to wear it?<br />I know you. I used to <span style="font-style: italic;">be</span> you. That's when I started listening to the <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">Guerrilla Radio Show</a>. Tonight's show is part of our intro series, Ethics 101. <a href="http://www.kcsb.org/webcast">Tune in</a>, as we laugh, cry, and maybe even learn a little something about ourselves. That's right, the webcast is back up after being down for several weeks, and the show's back in action! Join us, won't we?<br /><br />On another note, the <a href="http://philosophy.ucsb.edu">department website</a> is currently getting a minor overhaul. We're cleaning up the code crumbs and bringing you some more greasy goodness. Greasy in a good way.<br /><br />Josh May has announced the rock and roll creation of another discussion/reading group, this one focusing on the Metaphysics. There's even a <a href="http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~jdmay/metagroup.htm">webpage</a>. Hot damn.<br /><br />Everybody keep thinkin'... and watch out for snakes.Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16781999.post-1133313704760697012005-11-29T16:47:00.000-08:002005-11-29T17:21:45.426-08:00I will choose free willHey folks. The Guerilla Radio Show returns to full power tonight with a show on Free Will. What is Free Will? How can I get some? If you choose not to decide, have you still made a choice? Check us out on KCSB 91.9 if you can get it on your radio. Unfortunately, as far as I can tell the KCSB webcast is currently not functioning, so if you're not in our radio listening area, you won't be able to hear the show until we archive it on the <a href="http://www.guerrillaradioshow.com">GRS website</a>, which should be fairly soon after the broadcast.<br /><br />And here's a quick philosophical/logical question for your blog-reading (dis)pleasure: if laws (of nature) are more than just regularities, but the laws of nature could have been different (e.g. E=mc<sup>2</sup> might have been false), then is there a way to cash out physical necessity in terms of possible worlds? Here's the problem: Say we have a law of nature /\x(Fx->Gx), which is true in this world, but not <i>necessary</i> because in some worlds there are different laws. It looks like there's no way to make this law "necessary" in any weaker way that doesn't break down into making it a contingent regularity. If we say that it's <i>physically necessary</i>, in the sort of standard way of formalizing that ([](LP->/\x(Fx->Gx)), where LP is a proposition stating some specified set of laws of physics; thus, the laws of physics strictly imply the regularity), we end up with a proposition that's <i>still</i> contingently true, because making it "physically necessary" in this way just made it true in worlds where the laws of physics <i>come out true</i>. If it's contingent that these laws of physics hold, then it's no less contingent that our regularity holds, if it only holds where the laws of physics do. We seem to want to say: the laws could have been different, but <i>given that</i> they are such-and-such, this regularity necessarily follows. But the standard ways to formalize this can only render it as: there are regularities that hold in only some worlds (specifically, worlds where certain other regularities hold); this seems to lack entirely the "necessity" we're looking for. Unless I'm missing something, there doesn't seem to be an obvious way to formalize physical <i>necessity</i> in the non-Humean, "necessitarian" way that a lot of philosophers would like to assert it. If that's the case, then either this is a deficiency in possible worlds semantics (I believe, though I haven't here argued, that this problem generalizes to any semantics of modal logic given in an extensional metalanguage, including Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactuals), or it indicates an incoherency in "necessitarian" physical necessity: physical necessity either can't be cashed out in terms of <i>truth</i> in a certain set of worlds, or it can and it's thus nothing more than a contingent regularity. I hope this is stated clearly enough that you can see the problem; it's kind of off-the-cuff, though, so I wouldn't be surprised if it's obscure. Of course, you can leave a comment asking for clarification. :)Luke Mhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15009745680674815040noreply@blogger.com3